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Abstract
There is little doubt in the literature, that poverty and liquidity constraints can drive
children out of school and into child labour in developing countries. But are there other
important explanations for low primary school enrolment rates? The child labour and
schooling literature often ignores that uncertainty about future returns results in a need for
risk diversication, that children function as old-age security providers when there are no
available pension systems, that the human capital investment decision of one child is likely
to be inuenced by that of his/her siblings, and that rural parents face a choice of investing
in either specic or general human capital of their children. In this paper, I investigate
the e¤ects of future income uncertainty on the joint human capital investment decision of
children in a household. I develop and calibrate a simple illustrative human capital portfolio
model and show that existing levels of uncertainty can indeed result in less than full school
enrolment within a household, even in a world of perfect credit markets. The paper thus
o¤ers an alternative explanation for why it might be optimal for rural parents not to send
all of their children to school.
Keywords: Schooling, child labour, specic human capital, traditional education, intergenerational trans-
fers, old-age security, uncertainty, income source diversication, liquidity constraints. JEL codes: J13,
J24, O15
Contact: hbl@r¤.dk. I am grateful to Martin Browning, Mette Ejrnæs, João Ejarque, Fane Groes, Mette
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1 Introduction
Primary school enrolment rates are low in many developing countries, and generally lower than
what policy makers aim for. This is problematic since schooling and human capital is central
for economic development. In the economic literature on child labour and schooling, the main
explanation for this lack of schooling is the inability of parents to borrow against the future en-
hanced earnings of children in order to nance their schooling today, e.g. Baland and Robinson
(2000), Ranjan (2001), Edmonds (2007). Most rural households live in a high risk environment
with incomplete credit and insurance markets, and virtually no social security system. Faced
with poverty or periodic income short falls, households have to resort to informal insurance
mechanisms to smooth consumption. It is often argued that one important mechanism is ad-
justing the labour supply of children as a means of ex-post risk coping. Liquidity constrained
households thus borrow on the human capital market rather than on the incomplete nancial
capital market. The focus on the constraints and costs side of the human capital investment
decision and on the use of child labour as a means of ex-post risk coping is the essence of the
explanations given in the child labour and schooling literature on why enrolment rates are low
and child labour widespread. Although these are valid explanations for why some children are
kept out of school in rural areas of developing countries, they might not constitute the full
explanation. It seems reasonable that households in risk prone environments will, apart from
their ex-post risk coping strategies, also consider the possibilities of ex-ante risk diversication.
In this paper, I therefore ask the following question: Can future income uncertainty result in
households keeping some of their children out of school as an optimal ex-ante risk diversication
strategy? I hypothesise that when there is uncertainty about future income of children and
when parents rely on this income for their old-age support, diversifying the future income
sources of children becomes an important means of ex-ante risk management. In rural areas,
the basis for such a diversication is laid already in the human capital investment decision.
Formal schooling will direct children towards future urban employment, whereas traditional
on-farm learning-by-doing will direct children towards the agricultural sector. With such a
sectoral divide in returns to education, the need for risk diversication, due to future income
uncertainty, can result in less than full enrolment into primary schools among siblings being an
optimal human capital investment strategy for the household. I nd that this is the case even if
there are perfect credit markets and schooling is the most protable human capital investment
choice for the individual child.
My main argument, that uncertainty and thus the need for risk diversication inuence
the joint schooling decision of children in a household, primarily grew out of insights from
literatures other than the child labour and schooling literature. These literatures will all be
reviewed in turn below, but the key points follow here. When focusing on a broader perspective
of the rural household rather than on the direct and indirect costs of schooling of the individual
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child, it becomes clear that the following factors may also inuence the joint human capital
investment decision of children in a household. First, future income is generally uncertain and
thus returns to education are uncertain. Second, in risk prone environments with very lim-
ited public pension schemes, children may not only play an important role in current ex-post
consumption smoothing, but also function as future old-age security assets of their parents.
Third, if there is uncertainty about the future income of children, ex-ante risk diversication
is an important means of income smoothing. There is thus no apparent reason to assume that
parents would consider the human capital investment decision of each child independently of
his or her siblings. Rather, if children indeed are the old-age security providers, then par-
ents should seek to optimize the portfolio of joint human capital investment decisions of their
children, such that they balance future returns and risk exposure. Finally, work participation
of children in household-based agricultural production systems may itself entail an important
element of training and, as such, be part of a traditional education. In such a traditional
rural environment, parents transfer specic human capital when working with their children,
directing these towards future agricultural self-employment. Formal schooling, on the other
hand, will direct them towards employment in the modern urban sector, where general human
capital skills are needed.
Building on these insights from the literature, I develop an illustrative portfolio model of
the joint human capital investment decision of all children in a household. The model is a
two-period unitary household model, where parents in the rst period decide on the optimal
human capital portfolio allocation of theirN children, where the choice is between either general
formal education (schooling) or specic traditional education (on-farm learning-by-doing). In
the second period, parents depend on the income of their adult children for consumption.
The formally educated children will earn income from the urban sector and the traditionally
educated children will earn income in the agricultural sector. Second period income is uncertain.
In the model I abstract from liquidity constraints and child labour in order to focus on the
pure e¤ects of future income uncertainty on schooling. My purpose is not to argue against
the inuence of poverty and credit constraints on schooling, but rather to complement these
existing explanations by analysing the human capital investment decisions of siblings jointly
and from an ex-ante risk management perspective. I wish to emphasise that the model is
only applicable to rural households where children can be engaged in traditional agricultural
production. Child labour is thus viewed solely as work participation in familiy-based farming.
The analysis should not be applied to children working as wage workers or otherwise under
hazardous or exploitative conditions.1
The analytical results of the model show that future income uncertainty has a negative
1See Edmonds (2007) for an overview of which types of economic activities working children engage in. Based
on cross-country UNICEF data sources, he estimates that 8% of children are engaged in wage work outside the
household.
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e¤ect on the proportion of children sent to school. However, this is a qualitative result and it
does not indicate whether existing levels of uncertainty could potentially keep some children
out of school purely due to future risk diversication, even if households are not liquidity
constrained in any way. The model is therefore calibrated using numerical values based on
household averages from a national household survey undertaken in Tanzania. As opposed to
two recent papers, which have also introduced uncertainty about the returns to schooling2, I
am able to show that a relatively small degree of uncertainty taken from a simple income spread
measure is enough for the optimal portfolio choice of the average household to be less than full
school enrolment, even in a world with perfect credit markets. Existing levels of uncertainty
can indeed result in parents only sending some, but not all children to school. This negative
e¤ect on the optimal human capital portfolio allocation can be surprisingly large, even in the
presence of perfect credit markets. For the average household, the pure e¤ect of uncertainty
is so strong that actual school enrolment rates could, in principle, be explained solely by the
existence of uncertainty. Thus, the roots of child labour and lack of schooling need not lie solely
with incomplete credit markets and poverty, but could also be caused by the fact that rural
households are not only concerned with securing their current, but also their future old-age
income. Future income uncertainty may constitute a very important element in the schooling
decisions of households and the need for future income source diversication and ex-ante risk
management can have direct implications for the optimal composition of a households human
capital portfolio of children. This adds a new perspective to the child labour debate, which has
previously been centered around the need for ex-post consumption smoothing in the liquidity
constrained household. These ndings have direct policy implications for educational policies,
the aim of which tends to be full enrolment into primary school. Policies, which only act on
the cost side of the human capital investment decision may be insu¢ cient in terms of reaching
full enrolment. It may well be necessary to supplement such policies with some that also act
on the return side of the investment decision.
Before turning to the details of the model, the next section looks at how this paper links
with existing papers on schooling and child labour, uncertainty about income, intergenerational
transfers and sibling dependence. The model is presented in section 3. Three di¤erent types of
preference structures are considered in slightly lengthly detail, mainly to ensure that prudence
is not generating the results. However, there is no indication of this being the case and the use
of standard CRRA preferences is probably the most appropriate choice. Calibration results are
shown in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
2See Pouliot (2005) and Estevan and Baland (2007). Although the latter focuses on mortality risk of young
adults, this is in some sense also a source of uncertainty about returns to schooling seen from the parental point
of view. However, as Estevan and Baland (2007) argue, young adult mortality risk may in regions of sub-Saharan
Africa dominate the intrinsic uncertainty associated with returns to education.
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2 Related Literature
As mentioned above, the idea that uncertainty and risk diversication can inuence the joint
schooling decision of all children in a household grew out of insights from literatures on uncer-
tainty, income and consumption smooting and risk diversiation, on retuns to specic versus
general human capital, on sibling dependency, and on intergenerational transfers and children
as old-age security assets. Drawing on these literature, a broader basis is formed for analysing
the human capital investment decisions of a household as a whole, rather than for the individual
child.
2.1 Income and consumption smoothing
It is well-known that most rural households in developing countries live in a high risk envi-
ronment with incomplete credit and insurance markets, very limited public pension schemes
and virtually no social security system. In such an environment, children may provide an
important source of informal insurance, consumption smoothing and future old-age security.
That is, they may play an important role both as providers of additional sources of income,
when anticipated income of parents is low in old-age; and in the risk management strategies
of the household aimed at shielding consumption from income variations. These strategies are
generally two-fold; ex-ante risk management through income smoothing or ex-post risk coping
through consumption smoothing, see e.g. Morduch (1995) and Dercon (2002), and for a more
detailed analysis see Fafchamps (2003). I return to the role of children as old-age security
providers in section 2.6 below.
Ex-ante, households smooth income by diversifying their income sources, labour supply
and investments. The farm household diversies income sources in part by diversifying the
household labour supply between on-farm and non-farm economic activities, but also by di-
versifying the on-farm investments and production portfolio between a variety of crops, land
holdings and animal stock. Examples of widespread use of on-farm/non-farm diversication
of labour supply are found in Reardon (1997), C.B. Barrett and P.Webb (2001) and Dercon
and Krishnan (1996). Morduch (1990), Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), and Dercon (1996)
all show that both the composition of agricultural investments and the production portfolio
are inuenced by the degree of income variability faced by a farm household. This results in
lower protability when income variability is high, because production portfolios with less risk
exposure and lower returns are chosen in high risk environment.
Ex-post, households shield consumption from idiosyncratic income shocks by obtaining
credit, depleting of assets and bu¤er stocks, readjusting the labour supply of household mem-
bers, and seeking assistance from the extended family or other informal risk sharing arrange-
ments, see Kotliko¤ and Spivak (1981), Townsend (1994) and Udry (1994). However, as
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Townsend (1994) showed, households are generally uninsured against covariate income shocks
at village level, typically due to adverse weather events. Under such circumstances, spatial
diversication of the extended family becomes an important informal insurance arrangement
through intergenerational transfers and remittances, see Rosenzweig (1988), Rosenzweig and
Stark (1989), and Appelbaum and Katz (1991).
Income and consumption smoothing mechanisms thus have important implications for the
allocation of labour and the investment portfolios of a household. The child labour literature
reviewed below has a strong emphasis on the role of children in achieving ex-post consumption
smoothing through increased child labour rather than schooling. However, the child labour
literature is virtually silent, when it comes to analysing the role of children in the ex-ante
income smoothing strategies of a household through future income diversication and informal
insurance possibilities, as suggested in the fertility literature, see below.
2.2 Child labour and schooling
There is, by now, an impressive number of articles in the child labour and schooling literature,
so many that various literature surveys have already been undertaken, see for example Basu
(1999), Andvig (2000), Brown, Stern, and Deardor¤ (2003), Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003)
and Edmonds (2007). I will therefore not even attempt at making an exhaustive review of the
literature, but rather focus on the subjects that this paper links with directly.
In general, the literature on child labour and schooling has focussed on one major reason
for children being sent to work: binding credit constraints which tend to go hand-in-hand with
poverty. Households are not able to cover the current costs of schooling. Most of the literature
is based on the intertemporal human capital investment model by Ben-Porath (1967). He
simply suggests that each individual must invest in an additional year of education as long as
the increase in the discounted future earnings is larger than the current direct costs (e.g. school
fees) and indirect costs (foregone earnings) of schooling. It is assumed that the individual can
borrow against his/her future earnings to nance each additional year of schooling at perfect
capital markets.
However, in developing countries, nancial capital markets are far from perfect and the
banking sector is almost non-existent. Credit sources are therefore often informal social net-
works or local moneylenders with high interest rates, see Udry (1994) and Deaton (1997, ch.6.3).
Such credit sources seldom provide a plausible means of nancing long term human capital in-
vestments, although they can be used for smoothing consumption in the short run when faced
with income shocks.
Basu and Van (1998), Baland and Robinson (2000) and Ranjan (1999, 2001) all analyse,
theoretically, how liquidity constraints can increase child work and reduce schooling because
parents are unable to reduce current consumption by the direct and indirect costs of schooling
6
due to poverty and they are unable to borrow against the future earnings of their children.
The fact that parents cannot borrow against the future income of their children, arise for two
reasons. One is the incomplete credit market, which limits intertemporal transfers. The other
is the problem of agency, or what Baland and Robinson (2000) model as insu¢ cient levels
of altruism between parents and children, which limits intergenerational transfers, see also
Parsons (1984), and Becker and Murphy (1988). The agency problem arises from the fact that
parents cannot strictly enforce repayment of the educational expenses when children become
adults and experience returns to the human capital investments made by parents when young.
However, although the theoretical papers, and in particular Baland and Robinson (2000), focus
on these two main reasons for child labour and lack of schooling, the corresponding empirical
literature has virtually only focussed on the e¤ect of binding credit constraints and poverty.
Few papers have analysed the link between child labour and intergenerational transfers, I will
return to this below.
Although there is general agreement, theoretically, about the negative e¤ects of poverty and
credit constraints on schooling, causal e¤ects and not mere correlations are hard to identify
empirically. Some studies have found the expected negative correlations between credit con-
straints, poverty and schooling, but this is at best suggestive evidence consistent with theory,
see Jacoby (1994), Jensen and Nielsen (1997) and Bhalotra (2007) for examples on household
data, and Krueger (1996) and Dehejia and Gatti (2002) for cross-country evidence. Yet, other
studies have found mixed evidence, no signicant correlations or even signicantly positive cor-
relations between income or wealth and child labour, see Coulombe and Canagarajah (1998),
and Ray (2000). Bhalotra and Heady (2003) emphasise that there can be a wealth paradox
in relation to child labour, which arise when there are imperfections in the land and labour
markets. If the demand for labour cannot be met, farm households may have to use own labour
resources, including those of their children.
A second group of studies have analysed the relationship between poverty and child labour
over the full income range. They all nd that it can be highly non-monotonic, locally. Edmonds
(2005) and Bhalotra (2007) base their theoretical set-up on the notion from Basu and Van
(1998) that only households which cannot a¤ord otherwise in terms of subsistence, send their
children to work. Edmonds (2005) nds that there is dramatic non-linearityin the relationship
between child labour and household expenditure in the neighbourhood of the poverty line.
The expected negative relationship generally only appears for households above the poverty
line. Bhalotra (2007) nds that sons in Pakistan do indeed engage in wage-work because
of subsistence poverty. Rogers and Swinnerton (2004) take a theoretical approach and use
the model in Baland and Robinson (2000) to show that rising incomes can lead to more child
labour. This happens when income rises enough to reduce old-age transfers from adult children
to parents, but not enough for the credit constraints not to bind and thus for parents to send
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their young children to school purely out of altruism. The result is that the relationship between
income and child labour may be neither monotonically decreasing nor continuous. All three
papers show that there is an overall negative relationship between income and child labour,
but local estimates can very well produce a positive or insignicant relationship due to local
non-monotonicities.
A third group of studies have focussed on estimating the e¤ect of exogenous transitory
variations in income on child labour and schooling. By choosing such an estimation strategy,
these studies come closer to identication of a causal relation between child labour and income
and, thus, of the possible e¤ect of credit constraints and consumption smoothing. Jacoby and
Skouas (1997), Jensen (2000) and Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2006) all estimate the e¤ect of
current transitory income shocks, either due to adverse weather or accidental unanticipated crop
loss (e.g. due to insects or re), on human capital investment or child labour. They nd clear
indications of self-insurance strategies resulting in a reduction of human capital investments
and/or increasing levels of child work. These adverse e¤ects of income shortfalls are contributed
to the lack of ex-post consumption smoothing possibilities on the local incomplete credit market.
Edmonds (2006) propose an alternative way of estimating the e¤ects of credit constraints on
child labour and schooling. He uses the timing of a fully anticipated age-dependent increase in
income, pensions. If credit markets are complete, the announcement of a permanent increase
in income should have an immediate e¤ect on schooling. If credit markets are incomplete and
households face borrowing constraints, the e¤ect on schooling will only occur after the increase
in income has actually taken place. He nds indications of credit constraints, especially in rural
areas.
The literature on how poverty and/or credit constraints a¤ect child labour and schooling
decisions concentrates on the need for ex-post consumption smoothing to overcome income
uctuations and current uncertainty. However, in this paper, I argue that the ex-ante need
for risk diversication might also be an important factor in the allocation of childrens time
between schooling and work. If schooling is considered an investment, any future uncertainty
about its return should have an impact on the decision to invest.
2.3 Uncertainty about future returns
A recent issue of Labour Economics (vol 14, issue 6) was devoted to research on education and
risk. Although the papers focus on education in the context of a developed country, several
points stand out. It is noted that even though investments in human capital are often thought
of in the same way as investments in nancial or physical capital, the concept of risk in returns
or future uncertainty is often missing in the discussion of schooling decisions, e.g. Hogan and
Walker (2007). And, importantly, Cunha and Heckman (2007) point to the fact that ex-ante,
not ex-post, returns are what agents act on, when making their schooling decision.
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In the literature on child labour and schooling in developing countries, very few papers
have looked at the e¤ect of future uncertainty. Fitzsimons (2007) estimates the e¤ect of future
uncertainty in parental income, predicted by past rainfall variability, on education choices of
children. Appelbaum and Katz (1991) analyse a similar problem theoretically. Both papers
nd negative e¤ects of future uncertainty in parental income on schooling when credit markets
are incomplete. Pouliot (2005) uses the Baland and Robinson (2000) model to show that
when there is incomplete insurance and uncertainty about returns to education, then the level
of child labour will be ine¢ ciently high, even when there are perfect credit markets and no
poverty (positive bequests from parents to children in old-age). However, Pouliot (2005) does
not consider the e¤ects of uncertainty on schooling and child labour, when parents rely on the
income of their children for old-age support, nor does he consider how much uncertainty is
necessary for child labour to dominate schooling. Estevan and Baland (2007) argue that only
high mortaility rates among adult children can generate enough uncertainty for parents to alter
their human capital investment decision.
Although this paper is closely related to the models of Pouliot (2005) and Estevan and Ba-
land (2007), it di¤ers in two fundamental ways. First, because the negative e¤ect of uncertainty
of schooling is established not only analytically, but also numerically by calibrating the model
using household survey data showing that existing levels of income variation is indeed enough
to predict strong negative e¤ects of uncertainty on schooling. Second, because the e¤ect of
future uncertainty on schooling is analysed for the full set of children at household level.
2.4 Siblings
Allowing for sibling dependency and portfolio e¤ects, which can yield very di¤erent predictions
compared to one-child models and, not least, provide an alternative explanation for sibling
di¤erences. There is a variety of papers analysing sibling di¤erences in educational attainment
and child labour. These papers are roughly grouped by two di¤erent approaches. One group
focus on explaining positive birth order e¤ects on schooling. Di¤erent explanations, which
are not simply attributed to parental preferences, have been given. If the household faces
credit constraints, older children might have to work to help nance the education of the
younger siblings, see Willis and Parish (1993), Emerson and Souza (2002) and Manacorda
(2006). The birth order e¤ects could also be due to the fertility decision being ruled by the
genetic endowment of the last born child. If the youngest child is high-ability, Ejrnæs and
Pörtner (2004) argue, then parents are more likely not to have additional children compared
to a situation where the youngest child is low ability. This results in a higher probability
of schooling among the youngest children. Edmonds (2006b) argue that older siblings (lower
birth order) have a comparative advantage over the younger ones in household production and
therefore are less likly to be sent to school.
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The other group of papers focus on explaining sibling di¤erences in general. Horowitz
and Wang (2004) also point to the fact that there might be heterogeneity in the ability of
children, which can lead to one child having a comparative advantage over other children in
the accumulation of human capital. Dahan and Gaviria (2003) show that di¤erences can also
arise, even for completely identical siblings, as long as households are credit constrained and
there are increasing returns to human capital investment (e.g. due to sheepskin e¤ects of school
diplomas). Their model has a clear empirical implication, very poor households will not be
educating any children, middle income households will be educating some and rich households
will be educating all children. Their ndings from Latin America are broadly consistent with
this prediction of the model. Morduch looks at, what he terms, sibling rivalry, see Garg and
Morduch (1998) and Morduch (2000). He argues that the competition for resources within
the household is gender specic and nds that moving from an all-brothers to an all-sisters
household can be benecial in terms of schooling (in Tanzania) or health (in Ghana). Bommier
and Lambert (2004) follow up on this and propose a test for whether such dependency among
siblings is due to competition for resources or a result of more complicated interactions between
siblings, say as being substitutes or complements for each other in the household production
function or in the parental utility function. Their empirical ndings are in favour of a model
with interaction, although their test does not allow them to identify where these interactions
originate from.
In the majority of these papers, sibling di¤erences stem from poverty or binding credit
constraints and the need for ex-post consumption smoothing. Only Bommier and Lambert
(2004) discuss the possibility that sibling di¤erences could arise due to explicit dependencies,
rather than dependency arising because of a common credit constraint.
By analysing the joint human capital investment decision for all children in a household,
I allow for dependency among siblings. The dependency in the model of this paper stems
purely from the need for future irisk diversication. Uncertainty about future returns a¤ects
the optimal human capital portfolio choice of the household in their balancing of risk exposure
against the level of returns. If there is no uncertainty about future returns, the model collapses
to a model of N identical and independent children for whom the educational choice will all
be the same and thus directly resembles standard child labour models in the literature.
2.5 Specic vs. general human capital
In some of the early economics literature on child labour and schooling, one can still come across
more positive aspects of child labour. For instance, in their classic survey, Rodgers and Standing
emphasise that (...) it is important not to confuse schooling with education. Many other
activities contribute to education, and some forms of economic activity are among them. and
(...) work itself may be an important component of "education" especially in household-based
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production systems (...)", Rodgers and Standing (1981, p.10 & p.33, respectively.). Bonnet
(1993) notes that work participation is part of a traditional educational process in Africa and
that this traditional education may o¤er the best survival prospects for the future, i.e. also
better than formal education. Here Bonnet, implicitly, touches upon two di¤erent aspects
of why children are working. One is the social anthropological aspect of work participation
being an important component of the traditional education and the socialisationof a child;
the other is the economic aspect focusing on the returns to traditional education compared to
formal education.
In the social anthropological literature, there is a clear distinction between traditional
education based on indigenous knowledge, and formal education based on Western principles.
In traditional education, children learn by participating in the work of, in the early years, their
mothers and, later for the boys, in the work of their fathers, Bradley (1993). Child labour is
regarded as the accumulation of specic human capital through learning-by-doing; it is a way
of socialisingthe child, i.e. of adapting it to its environment and teaching it the life skills
necessary for survival, Andvig (2000). African parents term it responsibility training, Agiobu-
Kemmer (1992). However, it should be emphasised that this type of traditional education is
concentrated in rural areas and less applicable to children in urban areas. Bekombo (1981)
notes, the productive activity of a child living in a rural and traditional environment is a means
of social integration and cannot be likened to paid work.But in a modern urban environment,
when childrens work is no longer integrated into an educational system it becomes a "deviant"
and "delinquent" activity (...), Bekombo (1981, p.114).
Bock (1998, 2002) takes the analysis of the educational element in child work particiption
one step deeper. He notes that parents are faced with a choice, when allocating their childrens
time to di¤erent tasks. Some tasks are more complex than others and therefore have a higher
learning potential. Parents thus have to make the trade-o¤ between letting their children do
simple (often boring) tasks with low learning but an immediate return, or letting them do more
di¢ cult tasks with high learning, more supervisional needs and only future returns in the form
of higher specic human capital. Child work may therefore not always bring immediate returns
as it is generally assumed in the recent economic child labour literature, but might even be
costly and time consuming for parents, the stronger the educational element. Bock emphasises
that there is a trade-o¤ between task complexity and immediate output within traditional
education and that parents are well aware of the need for generating learning opportunities for
their children to ensure future agricultural returns.
According to the social anthropological literature, the introduction of formal education
based on Western principles has not been unproblematic in Africa. The traditional concept of
knowledge was suddenly questioned. Western knowledge is seen as de-contextual and rational,
rather than ethical, Daun (1992). It is argued that Western education has induced unfavourable
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changes in the behaviour of students away from the African sense of collective concern towards
Western individualism, it has weakened the gerontocracies, threatened the continuation of
traditional values and way of life, and resulted in brain drain of the rural villages, see for
instance Schildkrout (1981), Daun (1992) and Odora (1992). Equally problematic, though, is
the perceived lack of returns of schooling, Rodgers and Standing (1981) and Bonnet (1993).
Agiobu-Kemmer (1992) notes that where traditional education hardly ever left an individual
jobless, formal Western education entails a risk of future urban unemployment. If this is,
indeed, the perception or even the reality of formal education in rural Africa that it broadens
your mind, but it does not tell you how to surviveas an African commentator puts it3, then
local reservations toward schooling and a continued emphasis on traditional specic learning is
fully understandable.
The economics literature on returns to schooling conrms that there are limited or even
no returns to formal education in simple traditional agricultural production systems. A key
contribution in this area is Rosenzweig (1995). He argues that there has to be productive
learning opportunities for schooling to result in positive returns. When the production tec-
nology is simple, schooling does not increase productivity. Children accumulate the necessary
human capital through specic experience when working along side their parents, Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1985). This is typically the case in traditional agricultural household-based pro-
duction systems, where best practises have been known for and passed on by generations,
Rosenzweig (1996). Returns to formal education are only positive, when new complex tech-
nologies are introduced, creating an environment for productive learning opportunities. An
example of this is the introduction of high-yielding variety seeds under the Green Revolution
in India, where Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) nd increasing returns to primary education
during periods of technical progress. Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1999) and Jolli¤e (2004)
conrm the ndings by Rosenzweig of low or no returns when agricultural technologies are
simple. They use data from rural Pakistan and rural Ghana and show that on-farm returns to
education are low, but o¤-farm returns can be high. This results in a shift of educated labour
resources within the farm household away from farm activities and towards non-farm economic
activities. Likewise, Fafchamps and Wahba (2006) nd that on-farm child labour drops and
schooling attendance increases with urban proximity, which they interpret as a reection of
local labour market possibilities. They note that participation in subsistence work - primarily
farming - may be seen as a benecial activity by parents, probably because it teaches important
skills to children, (Fafchamps and Wahba (2006)).
From this dispersed literature on the training component in on-farm child work, there
are two main points to emphasise; rst that child labour may be an important element in a
traditional educational system, which emphasises the accumulation of specic human capital
3Agiobu-Kemmer (1992, p.7)
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through experience; and second that returns to specic human capital might match or even be
higher than returns to general human capital acquired through formal schooling in traditional
rural environments. These two points seem largely ignored in the child labour literature, only
Bommier and Lambert (2000) and de Vreyer, Lambert, and Magnac (1999) have followed the
line of thought of distinguishing between specic and general human capital to explain delayed
enrolment into primary schools and sibling di¤erences in educational attainment. Surprisingly,
child work is generally modelled purely as an additional current income source, e.g. Basu and
Van (1998) and Baland and Robinson (2000) and the papers, which have followed in their
wake. Bommier and Dubois (2004) even go one step further and introduce disutility of labour
among children without adding the investment aspect4. These approaches are highly relevant,
when considering disturbing images of hazardous and exploitative child labour or even simple
wage work. Less so, when considering children engaged in traditional agricultural work on the
familiy-run farms or household plots. Indeed, the vast majority of the many working children
in Sub-Saharan Africa are engaged in these household-based production systems, see Bhalotra
and Tzannatos (2003).
In this paper, there is a clear distinction between traditional and formal education that
is between specic human capital aimed at the agricultural sector and general human capital
aimed at the modern urban sector. Child labour is thus seen as an educational alternative
to formal schooling with di¤erent future prospects. My purpose is not to argue against the
importance of child work in overcoming poverty, credit constraints and income shocks, but
simply to point to the fact that the role of children and their economic activities might be
more complex than that in a traditional agricultural environment.
2.6 Intergenerational transfers and children as old-age security
A central assumption in the portfolio model in section 3 is that parents depend on the income
of their children for old-age support. This assumption is based on the fertility literature, and
supported by empirical literature on intergenerational transfers.
In the fertility literature, the argument for having children often extends beyond a pure
consumption argument of parents deriving utility from having children, just as they derive
utility from consuming goods. This is especially the case, when analysing fertility decisions of
households faced with considerable risk, incomplete credit and insurance markets and highly
inadequate or no public pension or social security schemes. In such an environment, it is often
argued that children may function as security assets. Generally, the old-age security aspect of
children is emphasised and Nugent (1985) is, by now, a classic reference on the subject. Children
may also function as security assets in terms of insurance, because their future income sources
represent additional risk diversication possibilities, in particular Appelbaum and Katz (1991)
4They also do not consider the possibility that children might experience disutility of schooling.
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emphasise the risk diversication aspect, but Cain (1981, 1983) and Pörtner (2001) also discuss
the insurance role of children. In the fertility literature, children are thus naturally considered
as part of the ex-ante risk management strategies of a household. If children indeed play the
role of security assets, this is likely not only to a¤ect fertility, but also the human capital
investments in these children.
In the child labour and schooling literature, the old-age security motive for investing in the
general human capital of children, has often been dismissed due to agency problems, see e.g.
Udry (2004). That is, it is impossible for parents and children to engage in an intergenerational
enforceable contract of parents nancing the human capital investments of children in return
for future old-age transfers, Parsons (1984) and Becker and Murphy (1988). Thus, unless there
are high degrees of altruism between parents and children, old-age support is not seen as a
motive for human capital investments, e.g. Baland and Robinson (2000).
Nugent (1985) is aware of the problems of agency, in what he terms, loyalty of children to
their parents in old-age. He claims, however, that there is scope for loyalty training, which, he
argues, is facilitated by cultural norms in traditional societies. Norms is often argued to be an
e¤ective means of overcoming agency problems, see for instance De Vos (1985) and Lucas and
Stark (1985), but also Lassen and Lilleør (2008) for a more recent discussion5.
Despite possible agency problems, there is ample empirical evidence that intergenerational
transfers from children to parents do occur, e.g. Lee, Parish, and Willis (1994) and Lillard
and Willis (1997, 2002). And some suggestive evidence that such transfers are in fact part of
an informal old-age support system, Nugent and Gillaspy (1983) and De Vos (1985). More
recent studies achieve better identication of this informal support system, because they show
that the introduction of public security schemes, at least partially, crowd out private transfers,
see Cox and Jimenez (1992) for evidence from Peru, and Jensen (2003) for even more robust
evidence from South Africa. It therefore seems resonable to assume that parents rely on some
support from their children in old-age, although they might not be able to fully control it.
Recently, a few theoretical papers on child labour and schooling have acknowledged the
importance of future intergenerational transfers for the human capital investment decisions
today. Rogers and Swinnerton (2004) use the link between schooling and expected future
transfers from children to parents to show that the relationship between child labour and
parental income need not be monotonically decreasing, see above. Chakraborty and Das (2005)
argue that there is positive relationship between life expectancy and human capital investment,
because only parents that actually reach old-age will be able to benet from their educational
investments in their children. Raut and Tran (2005) suggest that if intergenerational transfers
5There is some discussion in the literature on intergenerational transfers about whether transfers from children
to parents occur as pure repayments of human capital investments, due to altruism or simply because social
norms dictate it, see e.g. Lucas and Stark (1985), Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko¤ (1997) and more recently Raut
and Tran (2005). This is a separate question, beyond the scope of this paper.
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are simply an alternative means of nancing schooling, then parental investment in eduaction is
socially optimal. Although, if intergenerational transfers are based on altruism and reciprocity,
then some parents will underinvest in their childrens human capital and their is scope for policy
intervention. Their ndings, using Indonesian data, support the latter hypothesis. These three
papers are the rst attempts at establishing a link between the literatures on child labour
and intergenerational transfers. By adding uncertainty about future income of children to the
equation, this paper is an additional contribution to such a link.
3 Theoretical Framework
The model developed in this paper di¤ers from most of the models in the existing child labour
literature in four ways. First, the model introduces uncertainty about the future returns to
education, i.e. about childrens future income. Second, parents rely on the future income of
their children for old-age support. This gives parents a clear incentive to choose an optimal
human capital portfolio of their children in terms of balancing returns and risk exposure,
given their degree of risk aversion. Third, the model is not a one parent - one child model
of human capital investment, but rather a one parent - N children model, where the human
capital investment decision of children is modelled jointly, thus allowing for sibling dependence.
Fourth, there is a clear distinction between general human capital acquired through schooling
and specic human capital acquired through work experience. Child labour is thus modelled as
an educational alternative, which directs children towards future agricultural income sources,
whereas formal schooling directs children towards future urban income sources.
A theoretical framework is designed, which emphasises the e¤ect of future uncertainty and
the need for risk diversication on the allocation of children between schooling and labour in a
household. To exhibit clearly what the e¤ects of uncertainty and risk diversication are, I begin
by abstracting from the conventional explanations for child labour and low school enrolment.
That is, I assume that credit markets are perfect, such that households do not face any liquidity
constraints, and that there are no agency problems between generations, such that parents can
rely on full old-age support from their children. Later both liquidity constraints and child
labour are introduced allowing me to compare model predictions under di¤erent scenarios.
The basic model set-up gives a general understanding of how uncertainty can a¤ect the
human capital investment allocation. By specifying a simple preference structure and the
sources of uncertainty, it is possible to arrive at closed form solutions. It is straightforward to
show analytically that uncertainty about future returns can have a negative e¤ect on schooling
both in a one-child model and for N children. However, the question of interest is whether
the negative e¤ect is large enough for the model to predict lower levels of schooling given
realistic levels of uncertainty about childrens future income. In section 4, the model is therefore
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calibrated using data driven numerical values for a variety of di¤erent preference structures and
under di¤erent scenarios.
3.1 The basic model
The model is a two period unitary household model, where parents function as a unied sole
decision maker. There is no discounting of the future and no interest rate on savings or credit.
In the rst period, parents earn agricultural income Y1; which they allocate between rst period
household consumption c1, savings s; and the education expenses for their N children. N is
assumed to be exogenously given, since the emphasis here is not on the e¤ect of uncertainty
on fertility decisions, but on the e¤ect of uncertainty on the joint human capital investment
decision of children, given the fertility of the household.6
There are two types of education in the model, general formal education achieved through
primary schooling and specic traditional education achieved through on-farm learning-by-
doing. Traditional education directs children towards future employment in the agricultural
sector (a), whereas formal education directs children towards future employment in the non-
agricultural urban sector (b) in the second period. Parents thus face a discrete choice for each
of the N children of whether he or she should be educated traditionally or formally. A child
can only receive one type of education7. In the second period, traditionally educated children
earn agricultural income, ya2 , whereas formally educated children earn urban income, y
b
2:
Parents do not generate any income in the second period, but rely fully on their savings
and the joint agricultural and urban income transfers from their N children for second period
household consumption, c2. Second period income is uncertain. Parents therefore maximise a
joint von Neuman-Morgenstern expected utility function dened over and separable in house-
hold consumption, ct, where t = 1; 2: The utility function is assumed to be concave, such that
U 0(c) > 0 and U 00(c) < 0: The household solves the following maximisation problem
max
;s
EW (c1; c2) = U(c1) + EU(c2) (1)
subject to the budget constraints for period 1 and period 2, respectively
c1 = Y1   (1  )Nea   Neb   s (2)
c2 = N
 ((1  )Nya2 + Nyb2) + s
6 It is conceivable that the fertility decision and the human capital investment decision of the born and unborn
children are both inuenced by the parentspreference for old-age security, which suggests modelling the two
decisions jointly. However, to keep things simple, I focus on the e¤ect of future income uncertainty on the human
capital investmnet decision of children conditional on the household having completed their fertility.
7This is a simplifying assumption. The choice here is not on how many hours a child spends in school or
working, but rather whether he or she graduates with full primary school education or not.
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where  is the proportion of children, which parents have chosen to educate formally through
schooling. That is,  is the portfolio allocation of children between traditional and formal
human capital investments. The number of children who receive schooling in the rst period is
thus given by N and the number who are educated within the traditional agricultural based
system is (1 )N .8 The total amount of educational expenses is (1 )Nea+Neb; where ea
is the educational expenditure for each child in traditional education, e.g. supervisional costs
of parents, and eb is the educational expenditure for each child in formal education, e.g. tuition
fees and uniform costs. Educational expenditures are allowed to di¤er over the two sectors,
and they are considered both non-negative.9
Savings can be negative, and both the discount rate and the interest rate are normalised to
unity and are thus explicitly left out of the model for simplicity. By assuming perfect credit
markets, I can ignore any e¤ect of liquidity constraints on the schooling decision and thus focus
on the e¤ect of future income uncertainty on the joint human capital portfolio decision of all
N children in the household. The question is: can this alone result in less than full school
enrolment among siblings, i.e. a model prediction of  < 1 solely due to uncertainty.
Second period consumption will equal any capital transfers from period one in terms of
savings or dissavings, s plus a fraction, 1=N; of total income of all children, which is given
by the income of children in the agricultural sector (1   )Nya2 ; and the income of children
in the urban sector Nyb2. Children are thus assumed to transfer a certain fraction of their
income to their parents. The fraction is the same for all children, irrespective of their sector of
employment, but it depends on their number of siblings for  > 0: In principle,  2 [0; 1]; but
in the following I will assume that  2]0; 1[ to ensure that there is a positive, but diminishing
marginal e¤ect of having more children on second period income. When  = 0, children share
all their income with their parents. When  = 1 children share only a fraction 1=N of their
income with their parents, resulting in parents receiving the equivalent of one full income from
their children in total. If there is only one child in the household that child will be the sole
breadwinner of the family in the second period and is forced to share his/her full income with
the parents, irrespective of the size of :
Parents are faced with two choice variables; how much to save or dissave s; and which
proportion of their children to educate formally through schooling . The rst order condition
with respect to s is
U 0(c1) = EU 0(c2) (3)
8For analytical simplicity,  is written as continuous in the theoretical model, but it will be treated as discrete
in the calibrations and in the empirical model.
9While the literature on child labour and schooling generally set ea as negative and thus as a source of income,
I here follow Bock (2002) in stating that the overall learning potential in the tasks completed by children in
agriculture is higher than the immediate return. If children were only undertaking tasks with no learning, but
high immediate output, such as fetching water or rewoods, there would be no transfer of farm-specic human
capital from parents to children and therefore no future agricultural return from such activities.
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That is, savings s will be chosen such that marginal utility in period one equals the expected
marginal utility of period two. The rst order condition with respect to  is given by equation
(4), where  is the optimal solution for the maximisation problem above
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for 0 <  < 1
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) > E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for  = 0
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) < E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for  = 1
(4)
where
E[N1 (yb2 ya2)U 0(c2)] = E(N1 (yb2 ya2))EU 0(c2)+cov(N1 yb2; U 0(c2)) cov(N1 ya2 ; U 0(c2))
Uncertainty about second period income results in two covariance terms, both negative, between
the second period income variables, ya2 and y
b
2, and marginal utility, U
0(c2). These terms will,
when they are strong enough, pull the optimal portfolio allocation,  away from each of the
two corner solutions. Uncertainty in the agricultural sector will have a positive e¤ect on 
because it will increase the right hand side of the rst order consition for  and pull towards
the  = 1 corner solution. Uncertainty in the urban sector, on the other hand, will have a
negative e¤ect on  because it will decrease the right hand side of the the rst order condition
for  and thus pull towards the  = 0 corner solution.
In the following, I assume that there is no covariant uncertainty between second period
income from children in the urban sector and children in the agricultural sector. This allows
me to simplify the problem by normalising uncertainty about income from the agricultural
sector to zero, and thus solely focus on the e¤ect of uncertainty of urban income on the
optimal proportion of children in formal schooling. Going back to the rst order condition
for ; equation (4), this means concentrating on the covariance term, which can reduce the
right-hand side of the rst order condition and thus reduce the optimal : That is, focusing
on the somewhat more relevant question of what can result in an optimal  below 1, rather
than what can result in an optimal  above 0.
This is not to say that there is no uncertainty in the agricultural sector, but rather that
uncertainty associated with income transfers from distant migrant children in the urban sector
is higher. These migrant children may face higher income levels, but also relatively more
variation, since the urban labour market entails a risk of unemployment, which is not present
among subsistence farmers in the agricultural sector. Furthermore, parents may also perceive
the size and the frequency of income transfers from urban migrant children to be more uncertain
compared to the daily support and in-kind assistance from home children engaged in local
agricultural sector10. The uncertainty, that parents face about income transfers from migrant
10The uncertainty could thus also, in e¤ect, be an intergenerational agency problem between parents and
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children in urban sector is modelled as a simple mean-preserving spread. Each migrant child
can either get a good (typically formal sector) job or not, where the probability of a good draw
in the urban labour market is given by p = 0:5. Migrant children in good jobs have an urban
income of yb2 =  + ", whereas migrant children without good jobs have an urban income of
yb2 =   ":11 This means that second period urban income is given by
yb2 =
(
+ "
  "
w.p.
w.p.
p = 0:5
(1  p) = 0:5
The mean and the variance for each child in the urban sector is E(yb2) =  and V ar(y
b
2) = "
2:
Given this specication of uncertainty, the rst order condition for  rewrites (4) as
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = N1 (  ya2)EU 0(c2) + cov[N1 yb2; U 0(c2)]  0
where the specication of the covariance term will depend on the degree of risk correlation
in the urban labour market outcome. The expected total income transfers from all the N
children, which have gone to the urban sector, is simply E(N1 yb2) = N1 ; independent
of the degree of risk correlation among migrant siblings. But the variance of their expected
total income, V ar(N1 yb2) and the covariance above, cov(N1 yb2; U 0(c2)) will both depend
on the degree of risk correlation in urban income.
I consider the two extremes where income transfers from siblings in urban employment are
either perfectly correlated or uncorrelated. Reality is likely to lie somewhere in between. When
there is perfect risk correlation among siblings in urban employment, all siblings will either have
a good draw and then their income transfers will amount to N1 (+"); or they will all have
a bad draw and then their income transfers will amount to N1 (  "), hence the variance
is V ar(N1 yb2) = 2N2 2"2 . When there is no risk correlation among siblings, they all
face the same urban labour market lottery irrespective of the labour market outcomes of their
siblings. The variance under no risk correlation is thus smaller and depends on the binomial
coe¢ cient
 
N
i

, where i denotes the number of successful siblings in the urban labour market
(i.e. those where yb2 = + ") and N is the total number of siblings in the urban sector in the
second period, V ar(N1 yb2) = N 
NP
i=0
 
N
i

1
2N
(i"  (N   i)")2 = N1 "2:
As long as uncertainty in the agricultural sector and the urban sector do not covary, house-
migrant children. Their degree of success is harder to monitor and lack of family control increases with the
distance. Social sanctions are often mentioned as e¤ective means in overcoming such agency problems and
thereby helping to reduce at least one source of future uncertainty. Lassen and Lilleør (2008) analyse the e¤ect
of such sanctions on the demand for formal schooling.
11 I do not explicitly consider a mortality risk of young adults as in Estevan and Baland (2007). However, the
model could easily be extended to include such risk, but if mortality risk is exogenous to choice of education, it
would simply just add a higher level of uncertainty in both the agricultural and urban sector. The qualitative
ndings of the model would not change.
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holds will have an incentive to diversify their human capital investments to reduce future risk
exposure. If the need for diversication is strong enough, this will have a negative impact on the
proportion of children sent to school in the optimal human capital portfolio of the household.
3.2 Specication of preferences
The choice of preference structure and degree of risk aversion is crucial for the model predictions.
In the following, analytical results are derived for the quadratic utility function to allow for
risk aversion without prudence. Prudence is introduced later, rst by introducing a very small
cubic term in the quadratic utility function, and second simply by looking at a standard CRRA
utility function, which incorporates both risk averison and prudence. Analytically, a model with
quadratic preferences is much more tractable than CRRA preferences, making it possible to
arrive at an analystical solution for  and to look at its derivatives. Numerically, however,
there is no di¤erence in tractability, and, CRRA preferences are likely to be a more realistic
preference structure. An additional benet of CRRA preferences is that only one parameter
needs to be determined exogenously, the relative degree of risk aversion, . The model is
calibrated for all three types of preferences in section 4, but the reported results will be mainly
on the model predictions based on CRRA preferences.
3.2.1 Quadratic utility
It seems plausible to expect households in developing countries to be both risk averse and
prudent. However, to keep these two matters apart and to ensure that results are not driven
by prudence in the preference structure, but only by risk aversion, assume for now that the
utility function is quadratic and thus that the third derivative is zero, i.e. no prudence. This
implies that there is certainty equivalence in the marginal utility, E(U 0(ct)) = U 0(E(ct)); since
marginal utility is linear in ct: Dene
U(ct) =Mct   1
2
ct
2 (5)
for both periods. M is the bliss point of maximum consumption. So utility increases in ct,
U 0(ct) = M   ct > 0; but at a decreasing rate, U 00(ct) =   < 0 and U 000(ct) = 0. It should
be noted that the quadratic utility function does not belong to the class of CRRA or CARA
utility functions, but has the rather awkward feature of increasing absolute risk aversion, when
the consumption level increases. I will return to this below.
Given the quadratic utility function, the rst order condition for s simply rewrites as
M   c1 =M   Ec2
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so the perfect credit market ensures that consumption in period 1 equals the expected con-
sumtion in period 2. From this it is also clear that in this simple model, endogenous N would
result in an innite number of children in each household as long as second period earnings
are higher than rst period education expenditures. Thus, since the choice of schooling is the
focus of this analysis, and not the fertility choice, N is modelled as an exogenous variable.
The rst order condition for the proportion of children in schooling,  under perfect risk
correlation becomes
N(eb   ea)(M   c1) = N1 (  ya2)(M   Ec2)  N2 2"2
and the equivalent equation under no risk correlation among siblings in second period urban
income is given by
N(eb   ea)(M   c1) = N1 (  ya2)(M   Ec2)  N1 2"2
Thus, only the covariance terms di¤er for these rst order conditions for . Under perfect risk
correlation cov(Nyb2; U
0(c2)) =  N2 2"2; and under no risk correlation cov(Nyb2; U 0(c2)) =
 N1 2"2; see appendix A1.
The rst order conditions are given by two equations in two unknowns, s and ; which
can be solved for analytically. When there is perfect risk correlation among siblings in urban
employment, the optimal educational allocation for the household in period one will be
cor =

 
N2M   (NY1 +Nya2  N1+ea)

 [N2 + 2N"2]
(6)
where  = (  ya2) N(eb   ea): The corresponding choice under no risk correlation among
urban employed siblings is
uncor =

 
N2M   (NY1 +Nya2  N1+ea)

 [N2 + 2"2]
(7)
If formal education is more costly than traditional education, but also su¢ ciently more prof-
itable in expectation such that  > 0, then  will always be positive, the question is if it
will ever be less than unity. From equation (6) and (7), it is clear that cor < uncor, the
optimal allocation of children into formal education will always be lower when there is perfect
risk correlation, compared to no risk correlation, among urban employed siblings. The optimal
choice of savings will di¤er correspondingly, scor > suncor: Only when there is no uncertainty,
" = 0; or only one child in the household, N = 1; will cor = uncor. It should be noted that if
" = 0 and N = 1; then this model collapses to a standard model of human capital investment
used in the child labour literature. Since there are no liquidity constraints or agency problems,
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the model will always predict full school enrolment when there is no uncertainty, irrespective
of the number of children in the household as long as returns to formal education are higher
than returns to agricultural education that is as long as  > 0.
The real question of interest here is whether uncertainty alone is enough to drive  below
unity even under perfect credit markets. From the analytical solutions for ,(6) and (7), it
is clear that an increase in uncertainty measured by " or similarly an increase in the variance
of urban income, "2; will always have a negative e¤ect on the optimal proportion of children
in formal education, . Under perfect risk correlation among siblings in the urban labour
market, the derivate is given by
@cor
@"2
=  2N(N
2M   (NY1 +Nya2  N1+ea))
 [N2 + 2N"2]2
< 0
and under no risk correlation by
@uncor
@"2
=  2(N
2M   (NY1 +Nya2  N1+ea))
 [N2 + 2"2]2
< 0
However, although the partial derivative of  with respect to " is clearly negative and stronger
uncer perfect risk correlation than in the uncorrelated case, it is uninformative about the size
of " necessary for the model to predict an optimal  below unity. To answer such question,
numerical solutions are needed, for this see calibration results in section 4.
Another partial derivative of interest is the e¤ect of belonging to a household with more
children, compared to one with less, on the optimal proportion of children in school, all else
equal. Given the portfolio approach in setting up the model, intuition says that the optimal
proportion of children in school should be reasonably constant for varying levels of N once N
is large enough to allow for some exibility in the somewhat discrete . E.g. for N = 2; 
can only take the follwoing three values [0; 12 ; 1]: Irrespective of the degree of risk correlation,
the derivates cannot be signed, indicating either a non-monotonic relationship or simply a not
very strong relationship. The partial derivatives with respect to N is given by
@cor
@N
=
0(2NM   (NY1  N1+ea)) 00Nya2 +N1+ea
N [N2 + 2N"2]
 (2N
M   (NY1 +Nya2  N1+ea))(2   2N(eb   ea) + 2"2)
 [N2 + 2N"2]2
7 0
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under perfect risk correlation, and under no risk correlation by
@uncor
@N
=
0(2NM   (NY1  N1+ea)) 00Nya2 +N1+ea
N [N2 + 2"2]
 (2N
M   (NY1 +Nya2  N1+ea))(2   2N(eb   ea))
 [N2 + 2"2]2
7 0
where both 0 = (  ya2)  2N(eb  ea) and 00 = (  ya2)  (1+)N(eb  ea) are positive.
These partial derivatives are of particular interest when compared to the ones produced by a
similar model with liquidity constraints. Liquidity constraints are likely to create sibling rivalry
over the limited resources, as suggested by the literature reviewed above, and one should expect
a clear negative e¤ect of coming from a household with more children compared to one with
less when both households are liquidity constrained, see section 3.3.
Finally, the model can also easily be extended to show the recently much debated empirical
result of non-monotonicity in income12. Since the model only applies to rural households, it is
reasonable to assume that the earning abilities of children working in the agricultural sector in
the second period are positively correlated with the income generated by their parents in the
same sector in the rst period. Such a positive relationship can be expected partly because
parents transfer specic human capital to their children when educating them traditionally,
and partly because children entering the agricultural sector would typically be endowed with
parental farm land or other local land with similar characteristics and thus similar earning
potentials, see Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985). By simply dening second period agricultural
income as a function of parental rst period income, such that ya2 = f(Y1); f
0 > 0, non-
monotonicity between proportion of children in school and parental rst period income is
generated. The partial derivative of  with respect to Y1 becomes ambiguous.
@
@Y1
=
 f 0(Y1)(2NM   (NY1 +Nf(Y1) N1+ea) + N)  N

+
2N2(2NM   (NY1 +Nf(Y1) N1+ea)f 0(Y1)
2
7 0
where  = N2 + 2N"2 under perfect risk correlation and  = N2 + 2"2 under no risk
correlation.
The non-monotonicity result is rather intuitive. If the agricultural sector generates high
levels of income, traditional education becomes a relatively more attractive alternative to formal
education, which will shift  more towards zero and thus change the composition of the optimal
household human capital portfolio away from schooling. This is particularly interesting in the
12See Bhalotra (2002), Bhalotra and Heady (2003), Edmonds (2005) and Rogers and Swinnerton (2004), as
well as section 2.2 for a discussion of these references.
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case where liquidity constraints are binding, because the positive e¤ect of higher parental
income is then counterbalanced by the agricultural sector becoming relatively more protable
compared to the urban sector and thus generates an inverse U replationship between  and
Y1, see section 3.3.
It should be noted that under quadratic preferences and no liquidity constraints, the direct
e¤ect of an income increase in Y1 without considering the correlation with ya2 has, counterin-
tuitively, a negative e¤ect on : Since  is already at its optimum regardless of rst period
income, an income increase translates directly into a consumption increase and thus an increase
in risk aversion. There is then an overall negative impact on investment in the risky compared
to the risk free asset. This is, as mentioned above, a rather awkward feature of the quadratic
utility function. Although quadratic preferences are more tractable analytically, they are less
attractive because they lack the constant relative risk aversion characteristic over consumption.
However, before turning to the more common class of CRRA utility functions, I will briey
analyse the e¤ect of prudence on the optimal human capital portfolio of the household.
3.2.2 Cubic utility
The quadratic utility function was chosen to ensure that the existence of prudence is not in
itself generating the results, and it will be shown below that the e¤ects of prudence might
be somewhat surprising. In order to be able to analyse the direct e¤ects of prudence on the
human capital investment decisions of the household, I will simply add a small cubic term to
the quadratic utility function in equation (5). This introduces prudence, as the third derivative
is now positive.
The cubic utility is given by
U(ct) =Mct   1
2
c2t +
1
6
c3t (8)
Where the prudence parameter is ; which is very small and postive. Now U 0(c) = M   c+
1
2c
2 > 0; U 00(c) =   + c < 0 (by assumption on the size of ), and the third derivative
is positive and given by the prudence parameter, U 000(c) =  > 0: Notice that there is no
longer certainty equivalence in the marginal utility due to the postive prudence parameter
EU 0(c2) > U 0(Ec2).13 This utility function is only well behaved for very small values of ;
which is all that is needed for determining the e¤ect of introducing prudence on the household
proportion of children in school, : This is simply given by the derivative of  with respect to
 measured at  = 0, @@

=0
: The optimal portfolio allocation  and savings level s under
prudence are found by solving the two rst order conditions. The maximisation problem is
the same as above. Under perfect risk correlation in the labour market outcome among urban
13See appendix A2:
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siblings, the rst order conditions with respect to s and ; (3) and (4), are now
M   c1 + 1
2
c21 = M   Ec2 +
1
2
(Ec2)
2 +
1
2
(N1 ")2
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = N1 (  ya2)

U 0(Ec2) +
1
2
(N1 ")2

  (   (  + ))N2 2"2
respectively, where EU 0(c2) =M   E(c2) + 12E(c2)2 + 12(N1 ")2:
And the corresponding rst order conditions under no risk correlation are
M   c1 + 1
2
c21 = M   E(c2) +
1
2
E(c2)
2 +
1
2
N1 2"2
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = N1 (  ya2)

U 0(Ec2) +
1
2
N1 2"2

  (   (  + ))2N1 2"2
for s and ; respectively, and EU 0(c2) =M   E(c2)+ 12E(c2)2+ 12N1 2"2: See appendix
A2 for derivations. Again, this gives two equations, which can be solved for the two unknowns,
s and .
It can then be shown, through implicit derivation of the analytical solutions for  with
respect to  that introducing prudence will have a positive e¤ect on the proportion of chil-
dren sent to school, @

@

=0
> 0: This may seem puzzling, since schooling is the more risky
investment. However, by setting up the cubic utility function, risk aversion and prudence are
two separate parameters. Prudence increases the preferences for precautionary savings and,
somewhat surprisingly, at the same time  has a negative impact on the relative risk aversion.
This can be seen from the specication of the degree of relative risk aversion under cubic pref-
erences:  cU 00(c)=U 0(c) = c(   c)=(M   c + 12c2). Introducing prudence thus makes it
optimal for the household to reduce consumption today and postpone it for the future, which
here results in allocating a larger proportion of children to the more costly and more risky type
of education, schooling.
3.2.3 CRRA utility
The constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions are among the most commonly
used utility functions. They allow for the presence of both risk aversion and prudence at the
same time, and as the name indicates, the relative degree of risk aversion does not change as
consumption levels increase, contrary to the quadratic utility function. It is therefore likely
to be a more realistic preference structure. Especially so, when looking at poor households
in developing countries. Analytically, however, the standard CRRA utility function is less
tractable than the quadratic utility function. The comparison of the two sets of preferences
will therefore be based on the calibration results, rather than on the analytical results.
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The CRRA utility function used in the calibrations below is given by
U(ct) =
 c1 t
1  ; for  6= 1
ln(ct); for  = 1
The constant relative risk aversion parameter is given by  =  cU 00(c)=U 0(c); where U 0(c) =
c  and U 00(c) =  c  1: Prudence is positive as can be seen from U 000(c) = (+ 1)c  2 >
0. The degree of relative prudence is also constant in consumption and given by  + 1 =
 cU 000(c)=U 00(c): Thus, here it is not possible to separate out the e¤ect of risk aversion from
the e¤ect of prudence, since they are both captured by :
3.3 Introducing liquidity constraints
The model described in section 3.1 with an unspecied preference structure di¤ers funda-
mentally from most models on child labour and schooling by including both future uncertainty
about returns to schooling, no liquidity constraints, no agency problems and N children. When
comparing this to the, by now, benchmark model developed by Baland & Robinson (2000), this
corresponds a situation, where uncertainty is added to their world of perfect capital markets
and two-sided altruism. This di¤ers from Pouliot (2005), who introduces uncertainty into the
parallel world of one-child households with one-sided altruism, positive bequests and perfect
capital markets, i.e. parents do not rely on their child for old-age support. As Pouliot, I nd a
clear negative e¤ect of uncertainty on schooling. The e¤ect is strengthened by the introduction
of a liquidity constraint and even more so if agency problems are also introduced because this,
in e¤ect, simply just increases the amount of uncertainty.
Most papers on child labour and schooling operate in a world with strong liquidity con-
traints. Shutting down the perfect credit market is a simple way of introducing such liquidity
constraints in the human capital porfolio model above. By doing so, the model predictions be-
come more directly comparable with the standard theories of child labour reviewed in section
2. In a world with no credit markets the households are faced with the following maximisation
problem
max

EW (c1; c2) = U(c1) + EU(c2)
subject to the budget constraints for period 1 and period 2, respectively
c1 = Y1   (1  )Nea   Neb
c2 = N
 ((1  )Nya2 + Nyb2)
There is now one rst order condition with one unknown, ; the analytical solution for which
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is
cor =
N1 y(M   N1 ya2) Ne(M   (Y1  Nea))
 [N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N2 2"2]
under perfect risk correlation in the urban labour market outcome among siblings and
uncor =
N1 y(M   N1 ya2) Ne(M   (Y1  Nea))
 [N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N1 2"2]
under no risk correlation. For both, y =    ya2 and e = eb   ea: From these analytical
solutions it is clear that now the relative size of the marginal utility in period one compared to
period two is important for determining the size of : If marginal utility in period one is very
high, the second term of the numerator is high, which in principle can run  below zero if it is
strong enough. The e¤ect of uncertainty on  (when  > 0) is now also stronger, especially
if N is high and for uncorrelated risk.
@cor
@"2
=  N
3 3y(M   N1 ya2) N3 2e(M   Y1 + Nea)
 [N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N2 2"2]2
< 0
@uncor
@"2
=  N
2 3y(M   N1 ya2) N2 2e(M   Y1 + Nea)
 [N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N1 2"2]2
< 0
The e¤ects of fertility on the proportion of children in school are also altered. They are
still ambiguous, but more likely to be negative than the corresponding derivatives under no
liquidity constraints, especially so if N is large or if  is close to 1 under no risk correlation
among urban siblings. The two partial derivatives are now given by
@cor
@N
=

N
 
 
(1  )N1 2(ya2 + 2y) + N (M   N1 ya2)

y
 [N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N2 2"2]
 N(e
a + 2e)e+ N1 2(2  2)"2
 [N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N2 2"2]
7 0
@uncor
@N
=

N
 
 
(1  )N1 2(ya2 + 2y) + N (M   N1 ya2)

y
 [N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N1 2"2]
 N(e
a + 2e)e+ N 2(1  2)"2
 [N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N1 2"2]
7 0
Finally, the non-monotonicity result with respect to parental income carries over to the
situation with liquidity constraints. For the liquidity constrained household there is a clear
direct positive e¤ect of an increase in rst period parental income
@cor
@Y1
=
Ne
N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N2 2"2
> 0
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@uncor
@Y1
=
Ne
N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N1 2"2
> 0
but the e¤ect is counterbalanced by the negative e¤ect of the corresponding increase in second
period agricultural income when ya2 = f(Y1); f
0 > 0, such that the overall e¤ect of an increase
in parental income becomes ambiguous
@cor
@Y1
=
@
@ya2
@ya2
@Y1
=
 N1   N1 +M f 0(Y1) + Ne+ 2N2 2yf 0(Y1)
 [N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N2 2"2]
7 0
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@Y1
=
@
@ya2
@ya2
@Y1
=
 N1   N1 +M f 0(Y1) + Ne+ 2N2 2yf 0(Y1)
 [N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N1 2"2]
7 0
both under perfect risk correlation and no risk correlation among siblings in the urban labour
market.
In previous literature, the non-monotonicity in the relationship between schooling or child
labour and income or even the lack of signicance in the correlation is generally explained by
either (i) a dramatic drop in the need for child labour as soon as the household is able to meet
subsistence needs based purely on parental earnings, which generates strong non-linearities in
the demand for child labour in the neighbourhood of the poverty line, Basu and Van (1998) and
Edmonds (2005); (ii) missing or incomplete markets which can lead to the wealth paradox,
when child labour has to compensate for incomplete labour markets as in Bhalotra and Heady
(2003); (iii) or agency problems if parents cannot rely on getting the expected old-age support
from their children because these consider the second period parental income too high to be
in need of support, Rogers and Swinnerton (2004). All three explanations generate local non-
monotonicities, while maintaining a global postively monotonic relationship between schooling
and parental income.
In this paper, the non-monotonicity between income and schooling stems from the relative
attractiveness of the agricultural sector compared to the urban sector, and from the assumption
that there are no additional returns from formal compared to traditional education in the
traditional agricultural sector. This generates global non-monotonicity with a positive e¤ect of
parental income on  for lower levels of Y1 and a negative e¤ect for higher levels of Y1, since
Y1 and second period agricultural income ya2 are highly positively correlated.
4 Calibrations
Although one can nd analytical solutions for the optimal proportion of formally educated
children,  and show analytically that there is a negative e¤ect of income dispersion or uncer-
tainty, @@" < 0, this does not indicate whether existing levels of uncertainty in urban income can
actually result in less than full enrolment within a household. Only by calibrating the model,
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using actual levels of school expenditures and income, is it possible to determine whether exist-
ing urban income dispersion, V ar(yb2) = "
2 is enough for the model to predict that at least one
child will be educated traditionally and thus result in  < 1 even when there are no liquidity
constraints: That is, whether existing levels of urban income uncertainty could potentially keep
some children out of school purely due to future income diversication. Here it should be noted
that, for calibration purposes, I am essentially equating uncertainty with income dispersion,
and that the number of children in the calibration analysis is discrete.
In the following, there is a brief description of the data used and the assumptions made,
when determining the size of the exogenous variables in the calibrations. In section 4.2, I
show the results when calibrating the model from section 3 under quadratic, cubic and CRRA
preferences. The focus is on how schooling,  react to future income uncertainty, " when there
are no liquidity constraints and no child labour; and on how the model derivatives with respect
to N and Y1 compare to the calibration results. These are important for future empirical
testing of the model implications. In section 4.3, I introduce liquididity constraints and child
labour and compare these e¤ects to the e¤ects of uncertainty on schooling when there are no
child labour or liquidity constraints. The introduction of liquidity constraints and child labour
is meant as an illustrative example of how the model captures the main components of the child
labour literature, while allowing for the separate e¤ects of uncertainty on school enrolment.
Section 4.4 concludes.
4.1 Data
The model is calibrated using simple summary statistics from a large-scale nationwide house-
hold survey from Tanzania undertaken in 1994, the Human Resource and Development Survey
(HRDS)14. It is a nationally representative survey of 5,000 households out of which more than
half of the households have school-aged children. The HRDS data contains detailed information
on individual household members, their educational status and current economic activity. At
household level, it includes location, main source of income, detailed assets and expenditure
information and, not least, schooling expenditures information. For calibration purposes only
rural households with children of school-age are included, which results in a sample of 1982
households.
14The Tanzanian Human Resource and Development Survey (HRDS) is a nationally representative survey
from 1994 of 5,000 households. The survey was a joint e¤ort undertaken by the Department of Economics of
the University of Dar es Salaam, the Government of Tanzania, and the World Bank, and was funded by the
World Bank, the Government of Japan, and the British Overseas Development Agency. For more information
or access to the data see www.worldbank.org/lsms
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Table 1. Summary statistics of HRDS variables and their model equivalents.
HRDS variable HRDS data normalised Model
AE daily HH expenditure, urban sector mean 1.84 2.42 yb2
s.d. 2.02 1.99 "
AE daily HH expenditure, agri sector mean 0.76 1 Y1= ya2
s.d. 0.51 0
Annual school expenditure, cluster mean mean 5.96 0.02 eb
Total number of children in HH mean 3.91 N
Proportion of children in/through school mean 0.63 
# observations 1982
Data source: HRDS data. Note, yb2 is the household expenditure among urban households, where the main source of
income is urban. ya2 is the household expenditure among rural households, where the main source of income is agricultural.
All expenditure amounts are in USD. An exchange rate of 1 USD = 455 Tsh is used. AE is short for adult equivalent
The model is thus calibrated for the average rural household is school-aged children in 1994
Tanzania. Calibrating the model using data driven numerical values is helpful in determining
the relative levels of exogenous variables.
Rural and urban income levels are proxied by the adult equivalent household expenditure
levels for households in rural and urban areas, respectively. Expenditure measures in the data
include values of home production. Agricultural income, Y1 and ya2 are assumed to be of
the same size, and expected future urban income, E(yb2) =  is simply set to current adult
equivalent expenditure levels of urban households whose main income source is also urban.
The educational expenditure associated with schooling, eb is directly given in the data
as the cluster average of primary school expenditures. Since the model is set up for rural
households, the mean for rural clusters is used. The educational expenditure associated with
traditional agricultural education is not observable. If ea is negative, it can be thought of as the
opportunity costs of time children spend in school, and thus as a measure of income generated
by child labour. If ea is positive, it can be thought of as the opportunity costs of parentstime
spent supervising the children in traditional education. When calibrating the model with no
child labour and no liquidity constraints, I simply proxy ea by half of the costs associated with
formal schooling. Traditional education is then cheaper than formal education, but also less
protable.
Agricultural income levels in the two periods are normalised to unity, Y1 = ya2 = 1 with
zero standard deviation. This results in E(yb2) =  = 1:84=0:76 = 2:42 and " = s:d:(y
b
2) =p
(2:022   0:512)=0:76 = 2:24:15 The actual cost of schooling in rural areas is very low and only
15The expenditure standard deviation among urban households is very high due to a long right hand side tail
in the expenditure distribution. Alternatively, I therefore cap " at the value of , such that the urban uncertainty
is an uncertainty which either drives income in zero or doubles it, i.e. "b = 2:42  0:51=0:76 = 1:75
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2% of household expenditures, thus eb = 0:02 and ea = 0:01: These schooling expenditures do
not include indirect costs of schooling, such as distance, and should therefore be seen as a lower
bound. They do, however, include uniform costs. It should be noted that all of these amounts
are measured in USD and adult equivalent terms.
When calibrating the model, I primarily allow " andN to vary. The urban income dispersion
or uncertainty, " runs in the [0; 2:4] interval with steps of 0.1. Thus the degree of uncertainty
can run roughly from 0 to 100 per cent of average income level. The number of children, N
is allowed to be 1, 2, 4, or 6 children, i.e. the model is calibrated for discrete numbers of
children only and  can therefore also only take a limited number of values. N = 1 is included
to allow comparisons with the standard models of child labour and schooling in the literature.
According to the summary statistics in table 1, rural households have an average almost 4
children. The schooling rate among the 7-17 year olds in rural areas was 63% in 1994 (as
opposed to 66% at national level). Unless mentioned otherwise,  = 0:95. I choose a high
 in order to make rst and second period income levels comparable and to avoid strong
consumption smoothing mechanisms. The e¤ect of changing  is shown below.
As in the analytical set-up, the model is calibrated with two choice variables,  and s,
which are chosen to maximise the household utililty function (1) given the budget constraints
(2). The calibration results for  will show how large the dispersion in urban income, "2,
has to be for the model to produce realistic enrolment rates under the three di¤erent types of
preferences.
4.2 Preference structures
4.2.1 Quadratic utility
In order to calibrate the model for the quadratic utility function, it is necessary to specify the
preference parameters parameters, M and . In a world of no consumption smoothing, rst
period consumption would be below 1, whereas expected second period consumption would be
around 2 if all children are sent to school and  is close to 1. For these levels, M = 7 and the
risk aversion parameter,  = 2 ensure that marginal utilities of the two periods are positive
given the allowed variations in income.
The results for the optimal portfolio choice of the proportion of children in school,  are
summarised in gure 0 for the case of no risk correlation and perfect risk correlation in siblings
urban labour market outcome and for the specic case of N = 4. Figure 0 is meant as an
introduction to the following gures and therefore includes data points. Uncertainty measured
by " is on the X-axis, the optimal proportion of children in school,  is on the Y-axis. The
left panel shows the e¤ect of uncertainty on the optimal proportion of children in school, when
there is no correlation among migrant siblingsurban income risk. The right panel show the
e¤ect of uncertainty, when there is perfect correlation among siblingsurban income risk. When
31
uncertainty is perfectly uncorrelated (left panel), the model calibrations predict full enrolment
( = 1), given the parameter specications, as long as "  2:3: Remember, everything is
discrete. Thus, when epsilon jumps to " = 2:4;  = 0:75 meaning that the household now
chooses only to educate 3 out of 4 children formally, i.e. one child is educated traditionally. In
the right panel, less uncertainty is needed before it is optimal for the household to only send
3 out of 4 children to school. Already for " = 1:7;  = 0:75: As epsilon increases, the optimal
proportion of children in school drops, but in a discrete manner. For "  2:1; only 2 out of 4
children are sent to school.
[Figure 0]
Thus, as it was shown analytically above, there is a clear negative e¤ect of " on : The
important information is, however, that the negative e¤ect of uncertainty is present in the
neighbourhood of the actual level of urban income spread, that is for " = 2:24: As expected,
the e¤ect is stronger under perfect risk correlation compared to no risk correlation. Figure 0 is a
representation of the average household without any liquidity constraints or immediate returns
to child labour. The negative e¤ects of uncertainty on the optimal proportion of children
in school is purely driven by the need for risk diversication and thus future income source
diversication. When there is perfect risk correlation among siblings in their urban labour
market outcomes, the only source of risk diversication is between the agricultural and the
urban sector. On the other hand, when uncertainty about the urban labour market lottery
is perfectly uncorrelated across siblings, the risk diversication can happen both between the
agricultural and the urban sector, and among the migrant children in the urban sector, the
negative e¤ect of uncertainty is therefore substantially reduced.
In gure 1, I allow for di¤erent household sizes by letting the total number of children N
equal 1, 2, 4 or 6. It is clear that no matter how many children the household has, if parents
face no uncertainty about the future income of their children (" = 0); then they will always
educate all of their children irrespective of N: This is an obvious implication of the fact that
there are no liquidity constraints.
[Figure 1]
However, as uncertainty increases, there are clear portfolio e¤ects in households with more
than one child. For N = 1 there is no di¤erence between being in the world of perfectly
correlated or uncorrelated "s. This is natural, since the correlation is between migrant siblings
in urban areas. Comparing the two panels of gure 1 also gives an indication of the importance
of allowing for sibling dependence in the portfolio model. Assuming that the human capital
investment decision of each child in the household is made independently of all of his/her
siblings (which corresponds to the N = 1 case) and then just adding over the total number of
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children in the household will yield very di¤erent predictions from a model, where such sibling
dependence is taken into account, say for N = 4; in particularly so for correlated "s.
4.2.2 Cubic utility
Calibrating the cubic utility function as opposed to the quadratic is simply done by substituting
the utility function in (5) with the one in (8) using the same parameter values as above,
M = 7;  = 2 and now allowing the prudence parameter to vary at low values,  = [0:1; 0:4], to
ensure that U 00(c) will always be negative. The results are as expected. Introducing prudence
has a positive impact on the optimal proportion of children sent to school , which is mostly
evident from the case of perfect risk correlation in the urban labour market outcomes, see gure
2 for N = 4.
[Figure 2]
Figure 2 shows that for uncertainty levels of " = 2 and a prudence parameter  < 0:3,
households will educate 1 out of 4 children traditionally ( = 0:75) if there is perfect correlation
among siblings in the urban labour market, whereas they will educate all children formally
( = 1) if the urban labour market draws are perfectly uncorrelated over migrant children. For
  0:3 and "  2, all four children are sent to school. Compared to the quadratic preferences,
slightly higher levels of uncertainty is now necessary for it to be optimal for the household to
keep at least one child at home for traditional education. Formal education is simply a better
savings strategy than traditional education.
4.2.3 CRRA utility
Deciding on the parameter values for the quadratic and cubic preferences is somewhat arbitrary
in the sense that they are sensitive to the level of consumption and are chosen to ensure that
marginal utilities in both period one and period two are non-negative. The remaing results
are therefore all based on CRRA preferences. The value of the relative risk aversion parameter
of  is allowed to vary and all calibrations are done for  = 1, 2 and 3, although the results
reported in the text below are for  = 2: See appendix A3 for all CRRA calibration results.
In general, the larger  is, the more sensitive  is to changes in the exogenous variables and
increasing the relative risk aversion has the expected e¤ect of shifting the graphs downwards
and thus reducing the optimal proportion of children sent to school. Looking at the graphs,
there are indications that the chosen preference parameters of the quadratic and cubic utility
functions most closely resemble the case of log utility and  = 1:
[Figure 3]
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Figure 3 corresponds to gure 1 above, now based on CRRA preferences with  = 2: First, as
for the case of quadratic utility, households will always send all their children to school if there
is no uncertainty. Second, as the level of uncertainty about future urban income increases, the
need for risk diversication gets stronger and the optimal human capital portfolio shifts towards
traditional education for one or more children. Under CRRA preferences, the model predicts
that the average household with 4 children will educate at least one child traditionally if the
dispersion in urban income " > 1:5 under perfect risk correlation in the urban labour market.
More uncertainty is needed when the urban labour market draws are perfectly uncorrelated
across migrant siblings, only when " > 2:1 will the household need to diversify income sources
not only within the urban sector, but also between the urban and the agricultural sector.
Again, the adjusted observed spread in urban income, " = 1:75; lies well within the span of
these two extremes. Third, the portfolio e¤ects of having more than one child are now more
pronounced compared to quadratic utility, higher N and thus higher consumption levels no
longer results in higher risk risk aversion as it is the case under quadrati preferences. There
are clear positive portfolio e¤ects of belonging to households with more children compared to
less when the urban labour markets draws are perfectly uncorrelated, more children makes
it possible to increase the diversication of the urban income risk reducing the need for the
agricultural sector in achieving the optimal risk diversication. The results are more ambiguous
when there is perfect correlation in the urban labour markets draws.
The important thing to notice here is that existing levels of uncertainty can indeed result in
parents only sending some, but not all children to school. This negative e¤ect on the optimal
human capital portfolio allocation is surprisingly large, taking the perfect credit markets into
consideration. Even for moderate levels of uncertainty, which match the actual income spread
among urban households, and without any liquidity constrainst or child labour, the model is
able to predict an interval of optimal school enrolment rates within which the actual enrolment
rate of  = 0:63 lies. For the average household, the pure e¤ect of uncertainty is thus so strong
that actual school enrolment rates could, in principle, be explained solely by the existence
of uncertainty. Hence, the roots of child labour and lack of schooling need not lie solely
with incomplete credit markets and poverty, but could also be caused by the fact that rural
households are not only concerned with securing their current, but also their future old-age
income.
The calibration of this simple human capital portfolio model thus shows that realistic
levels of uncertainty about future income of children can indeeed have a negative impact on
the optimal proportion of children in school within the household, even under no liquidity
constraints and only future returns to children engaged in traditional education. This central
implication of the model relies upon the assumptions of parents depending on their children
for old age security, of no covariant risk between urban and agricultural income, as well as on
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the sectoral divide in returns to formal and traditional education. Assumptions which might
not be standard in the child labour and schooling literature, but which each have substantial
support in other literatures, all reviewed above.
4.3 Introducing child labour and liquidity constraints
Literature on child labour and schooling focuses on explaining the existence of child labour and
lack of schooling as consequences of ex-post risk coping mechanisms when households are faced
with negative income shocks and of the inability of parents to borrow against the future returns
of schooling of the children. That is, they assume liquidity constraints and immediate net
returns to children working in the traditional agricultural sector as opposed to future returns.
In the following, I allow for both. Child labour thus still carries an element of education in the
sense that there are returns to learning-by-doing and ya2 >  ea. By introducing both liquidity
constraints and child labour, I am able to compare the model predictions under uncertainty
(" > 0) and sibling dependence (N > 1) with those of standard child labour models under no
uncertainty (" = 0) and one-child households (N = 1); as well as with the two recent papers
where uncertainty has been introduced into one-child households.
In gure 4, simple liquidity constraints have been introduced in the portfolio model above
under CRRA preferences. Households can now save, but they can no longer borrow on the
credit market, s  0. Figure A3 in appendix A3 shows the corresponding gures under di¤erent
degrees of relative risk aversion. Comparing gure 3 and 4 (as well as gures A1 and A3),
it easily shows that - given the numerical values for the average household, where costs of
schooling are relatively low and returns are 1.5 times larger than in the agricultural sector - the
introduction of a liquidity constraint has virtually no e¤ect16. Only once immediate returns to
child labour are also introduced such that one child in the agricultural sector generates exactly
enough income to cover the schooling expenses of a sibling ea =  eb; is there a clear negative
e¤ect.
[Figure 4 & 5]
The introduction of child labour as an immediate return to traditional education generates
a possibility of transferring income from period two to period one via the human capital market,
given the incompleteness of the nancial capital market. This does not seem to be necessary
for households with 4 children or less, but for households with 6 children it is now optimal
to always educate one child traditionally, even when there is no uncertainty. Comparing the
isolated e¤ect of uncertainty in gure 3 with the isolated e¤ect of liquidity constraints and
16 In chapter 4 of this thesis, the same model is calibrated using numerical values from a di¤erent data set
where costs of schooling is slightly higher and returns are lower, and there are more children in the average
household. This results in more markedly e¤ects of introducing liquidity constraints.
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child labour for " = 0 in gure 5, it is clear that uncertainty has a negative e¤ect on the
optimal choice of education of all children, whereas the constraint and child labour e¤ects only
really dominate in households with more children than the average N = 4: This emphasises the
importance of allowing for N children, rather than just one child. Assuming that the optimal
solution for one child carries through for all N children of the same household is clearly not
correct, regardless of the degree of uncertainty. Under no uncertainty, even if the immediate
returns to child labour were of the same size as current parental income or future returns to
traditional education, i.e.  ea = Y1 = ya2 = 1; the optimal solution for the one child would still
be schooling, unless future returns are discounted enough to drop below current returns. As
uncertainty about future urban income increases, the importance of allowing for some degree
of sibling dependency is clear from the portfolio e¤ects implied by di¤erences in fertility. These
portfolio e¤ects seem even more pronounced in gure 5, compared to gure 4.
The main conclusion to take from these calibration results is that although the combination
of child labour and liquidity constraints can have negative e¤ects on the optimal proportion of
children in school, these e¤ects are strengthened partly by the introduction of N > 1 children,
and partly by the existence of uncertainty " > 0, which also in itself has strong negative e¤ects
on the optimal human capital portfolio. While the existing explanations in the literature for
low enrolment rates into primary schools are focussed on the inability of parents to meet the
direct and indirect costs of schooling and the role of children in ex-post risk coping mechanisms,
the calibrations show that the ex-ante risk diversication strategies of a household may be at
least equally important for the human capital investment decisions of the household. The
introduction of uncertainty into a simple human capital portfolio model, which allows for a
joint schooling decision of children in a household thus o¤ers an alternative and complementary
explanation to why it may be optimal for parents not to send all of their children to school,
even if they can a¤ord to do so.
In addition, the portfolio model o¤ers a simple explanation for a non-monotonic relationship
between child labour, schooling and income. The di¤erence in returns between the agricultural
sector and the urban sector generates global non-monotonicity, as discussed above. This is
obvious from gure 6, which shows the e¤ect on di¤erent income levels Y1 = [0:5; 3] on the
optimal human capital portfolio  for the average household with N = 4 under liquidity
constrainst and with immediate returns to child labour. For the very low levels of (agricultural)
income there is a positive e¤ect of income increases on  driven by the fact that the household
is constrained and income increases allow households to allocate more children to the most
protable educational alternative, schooling. However, if the rst period parental income is
very high, so is the expected second period agricultural income and thus the relative returns
to traditional education compared to formal education increase, making traditional education
relatively more attractive. It is therefore optimal for the household to educate some children
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traditionally. This shift toward traditional education happens earlier the higher the level of
uncertainty in the urban sector relative to the agricultural sector, which here is normalised to
be risk free. This provides an alternative explanation for the mixed empirical evidence with
respect to income, schooling and child labour.
[Figure 6]
Finally, it should be noted that there is one parameter in the calibration, which has not yet
been discussed, : This determines the fraction of income that each child shares with his/her
parents in the second period. When  = 0, children share all of their income with parents,
when  = 1 children share 1=Nth of their income with parents. In all of the calibrations above
 = 0:95 and thus children share slightly more than 1=Nth of their income with parents, such
that parents in the second period in total receives slightly more than one full income. This
number is, of course, chosen arbitrarily. From the three panels of gure A7, it shows that
the e¤ect of changes in  are fairly small when there is no immediate return to child labour,
but large and negative as  approaches zero and there are immediate returns to child labour.
This e¤ect is purely a result of consumption smoothing. For very low ; parental income
in the second period can be more than N times the current rst period income and the only
possibility of transferring resources from the second period to the rst period is to shift children
from formal education to traditional education, which now generates not only future but also
immediate returns. Thus for low levels of ; the negative e¤ects of the combination of liquidity
constraints and child labour are strengthened.
5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this paper I asked the question of whether future income uncertainty can result in households
not educating all their children formally as an optimal risk diversication strategy to secure old-
age subsistence of parents. To answer the question I develop a simple portfolio model of human
capital investment of all children in a household. The model di¤ers from most models of child
labour and schooling by analysing the human capital investment decisions from the broader
perspective of a rural household, allowing for future income uncertainty and considering both
the old-age dependency of parents on children and the sibling dependency. When focusing
on the human capital investment decisions of all children, it becomes obvious that several
factors can inuence such the joint decision. The basis for the model and its assumptions build
on insights from di¤erent strands of literature with the aim of incorporating the variety of
factors, which could be of importance. The emphasis is placed on ex-ante, rather than ex-post,
risk diversication as a means of income smoothing, on the strong sectoral divide between the
agricultural and urban sector and the dichotomy in the returns to specic versus general human
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capital, on the role of children as old-age security assets of their parents, and on the dependency
that this creates among siblings because educational choices are not made independently for
each child, but rather as a joint decision over siblings giving natural rise to sibling di¤erences,
which is not in any way driven by heterogenity or adverse economic conditions.
It is straightforward to show analytically that uncertainty about future income transfers
from children, which in essence is uncertainty about returns to the human capital investments,
has a negative e¤ect on investments in the most uncertain type of human capital, here schooling.
This result hinges upon the assumption of a sectoral divide in returns to formal and traditional
education for which there is ample evidence in the literature, e.g. Rosenzweig (1995), Foster
and Rosenzweig (1996) and Fafchamps and Wahba (2006).
The analytical result is, however, a qualitative nding and it does not indicate whether
actual levels of uncertainty have any e¤ect on the optimal proportion of children in school.
The actual level of uncertainty could in principle be too low for the household to consider it
worth giving up income in return for less risk exposure. The model is therefore calibrated
using data driven numerical values and a variety of di¤erence preference specications. I nd
that moderate levels of uncertainty, based on the spread of income observed in data, is enough
uncertainty for the average household choose a suboptimal human capital portfolio allocation
of their children compared to a situation of no uncertainty. The need for risk diversication can
thus result in parents only sending some, but not all, children to school. The negative e¤ect of
uncertainty is surprisingly large. Comparing the isolated e¤ect of uncertainty with the isolated
e¤ect of liquidity constraints and child labour, it is clear that uncertainty inuence the optimal
choice of education of all children, whereas the constraint and child labour e¤ects only really
dominate in households with more children than the average N = 4: Although fairly robust to
the choice of preference parameters, these results are based on simple moments taken from the
data. The logical next step is therefore to nd empirical implications of the model, which can
be estimated and tested on a full data set.
However, based on the ndings of the model calibrations, it does seem safe to conclude that
future income uncertainty can indeed result in less than full school enrolment among siblings
of a household. The focus on ex-ante income smoothing adds a new perspective to the child
labour debate, which has previously been centered around the need for ex-post consumption
smoothing for the liquidity constrained household. It also has direct implications for educa-
tional policies aimed at ensuring full enrolment, since lack of enrolment might not only be a
matter of costs of schooling, but also of content. If the dichotomy in the educational system
force parents to diversify human capital investments of their young children between traditional
agricultural education and modern formal schooling in order to achieve future income source
diversication, then an obvious policy implication is to increase the returns of formal schooling
in the agricultural sector. This can be done either by shifting part of the traditional educa-
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tion, currently undertaken by parents, into the formal schooling system, thus teaching children
specic agricultural skills along with more general skills, such as writing and alegra; or by
modernising the agricultural sector to create learning opportunitesand thus increase returns
to formal schooling in the agricultural sector, see Foster and Rosenzweig (1996). Households
are likely still to diversify future income sources, but it need no longer be a diversication
decision taken at an early stage of human capital investments.
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6 Figures
Figure 0. Quadratic preferences (M = 7;  = 2), e¤ect of uncertainty, " on proportion of
children in school, 
Figure 1. Quadratic preferences (M = 7;  = 2), e¤ect of uncertainty, " on proportion of
children in school,  over number of children in the household, N:
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Figure 2. Cubic preferences (M = 7;  = 2), e¤ect of uncertainty, " on proportion of
children in school,  over di¤erent degrees of prudence,  and for xed N = 4
Figure 3. CRRA preferences ( = 2), e¤ect of uncertainty, " on proportion of children in
school,  over number of children in the household, N
- under no liquidity constraints and no child labour
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Figure 4. CRRA preferences ( = 2), e¤ect of uncertainty, " on proportion of children in
school,  over number of children in the household, N
- under liquidity constraints and no child labour
Figure 5. CRRA preferences ( = 2), e¤ect of uncertainty, " on proportion of children in
school,  over number of children in the household, N
- under liquidity constraints and child labour
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Figure 6. CRRA preferences ( = 2), e¤ect of agricultural income Y1 on proportion of
children in school,  for N = 4
- under liquidity constraints and child labour
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7 Appendix A1
The covariance term cov(N1 yb2; U 0(c2)) di¤er depending on whether there is perfect risk
correlation or no risk correlation between the second period urban labour market outcome of
siblings. Under perfect risk correlation and quadratic preferences, the covariance term is given
by
cov(N1 yb2; U
0(c2)) = E[(N1 yb2  N1 )(U 0(c2)  EU 0(c2))]
=
1
2
[(N1 (+ ") N1 )(fM   (N (1  )Nya2 + N(+ ") + s)g
 fM   (N (1  )Nya2 + N+ s)g)]
+
1
2
[(N1 (  ") N1 )(fM   (N (1  )Nya2 + N(  ") + s)g
 fM   (N (1  )Nya2 + N+ s)g)]
=
1
2
[ N2(1 )"2] + 1
2
[ N2(1 )( ")2]
=  N2 2"2
Under no risk correlation, it is given by
cov(N1 yb2; U
0(c2)) = E[(N1 yb2  N1 )(U 0(c2)  EU 0(c2))]
= E[N1 (yb2   )( N1 (yb2   ))]
=  N 2E[fN(yb2   )gfN(yb2   )g]
=  N 2
NP
i=0

N
i

1
2N
f[(1  )N + i]"  [N   i]"gfi"  [N   i]"g
=  N1 2"2
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Deriving rst order conditions under the cubic utility function. The rst order condition for
savings, s under perfect risk correlation among siblings in urban labour market is
U 0(c1) = EU 0(c2)
M   c1 + 1
2
c21 = M   Ec2 +
1
2
E(c22)
M   c1 + 1
2
c21 = M   Ec2 +
1
2
E([(1  )N1 ya2 + N1 yb2 + s]2)
M   c1 + 1
2
c21 = M   Ec2 +
1
2
(Ec2)
2 +
1
2
(N1 ")2
and under no risk correlation is
U 0(c1) = EU 0(c2)
M   c1 + 1
2
c21 = M   Ec2 +
1
2
E(c22)
M   c1 + 1
2
c21 = M   Ec2 +
1
2

NP
i=0

N
i

1
2N
[Ec2 +N
 ((N   i)"  i")]2
M   c1 + 1
2
c21 = M   E(c2) +
1
2
E(c2)
2 +
1
2
N1 2"2
The covariance term in the rst order condition for the proportion of children in formal
education,  under perfect risk correlation among siblings in urban labour market is then
cov(N1 yb2; U
0(c2)) = E[(N1 yb2  N1 )(U 0(c2)  EU 0(c2))]
= E[N1 (yb2   )( (c2   Ec2) +
1
2
(c22   E(c2)2   (N1 ")2))]
= E[N1 (yb2   )( N1 (yb2   )
+
1
2
((N1 yb2)
2 + (N1 )2 + 2 N1 (yb2   )2   (N1 ")2))]
= (  + (  + ))N2 2"2
where   = (1  )N1 ya2 + s. The rst order condition for  under perfect risk correlation is
then given by
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = N1 (  ya2)EU 0(c2) + cov[N1 yb2; U 0(c2)]
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = N1 (  ya2)

U 0(Ec2) +
1
2
(N1 ")2

  (   (  + ))N2 2"2
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while under no risk correlation the covariance is
cov(N1 yb2; U
0(c2)) = E[(N1 yb2  N1 )(U 0(c2)  EU 0(c2))]
= E[N1 (yb2   )( (c2   Ec2) +
1
2
(c22   E(c2)2   N1 2"2))]
= E[N1 (yb2   )( N1 (yb2   )
+
1
2
((N1 yb2)
2   (N1 )2 + 2 N1 (yb2   )  N1 2"2))]
=
NP
i=0

N
i

1
2N
[N 2(  + (  + ) ((N   i)"  ((1  )N + i)")2)
+
1
2
N 3(
 
(N   i)"  ((1  )N + i)")3    (N   i)2"3 + ((1  )N + i)2( "3)]
= (  + (  + ))2N1 2"2
where   = (1  )N1 ya2 + s. The rst order condition for  under no risk correlation is then
given by
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = N1 (  ya2)EU 0(c2) + cov[N1 yb2; U 0(c2)]
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = N1 (  ya2)

U 0(Ec2) +
1
2
N1 2"2

  (   (  + ))2N1 2"2
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9 Appendix A3: CRRA gures
Figure A1. E¤ect of uncertainty " on  under no liquidity constraints and no child labour.
54
Figure A2. E¤ect of agricultural income Y1 on  under no liquidity constraints and no
child labour.
55
Figure A3. E¤ect of uncertainty " on  under liquidity constraints and no child labour.
56
Figure A4. E¤ect of agricultural income Y1 on  under liquidity constraints and no child
labour.
57
Figure A5. E¤ect of uncertainty " on  under liquidity constraints and child labour.
58
Figure A6. E¤ect of agricultural income Y1 on  under liquidity constraints and child
labour.
59
Figure A7 E¤ect of changes in  on 
- under no liquidity constraints and no child labour
- under liquidity constraints and no child labour
- under liquidity constraints and child labour
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